A History of Twentieth-Century Germany by Ulrich Herbert

Author:Ulrich Herbert
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2019-11-03T16:00:00+00:00

Jaspers’ theses had a tremendous impact, though most reactions were critical. People strongly objected to the link he made between the Nazi past and the nation-state. From that time onwards, however, the argument about the underlying principles of Bonn’s policy towards the German question never died down.10

10. Brandt and Bahr followed up their ideas by negotiating with the GDR over humane measures to improve life for its citizens. A series of so-called Passierscheinabkommen (travel permit agreements), the first of which was made in 1963, allowed citizens of West Berlin to visit their relatives in the East over Christmas. 1.2 million applications were made: this alone shows the importance of the measure. But it had its price, because every round of negotiation, however many steps were taken to avoid giving the impression that SED rule over the East was accepted, did after all signify a degree of recognition. ‘The wall will not be taken down with travel permits’, said the new West German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard. He saw the agreement between West Berlin and the GDR as a kind of ‘Trojan horse’: ‘This is a cunning and deceitful way of smuggling in the theory of three states.’11 Erhard placed much more faith in improving relations with the Eastern bloc countries while avoiding recognition of the GDR. The new CDU Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder did in fact succeed in setting up trade missions in several Eastern bloc states without mentioning the GDR. But the Hallstein Doctrine, under which diplomatic relations would be broken off with any state which recognised the GDR, was still upheld, and it was for a certain period an effective lever for enforcing the Federal Republic’s claim to sole representation, thanks to its economic strength.

In the longer term, however, the West German government was susceptible to blackmail over the recognition issue. This was made evident in May 1965, when most of the Arab states reacted to the military support given to Israel by the Federal Republic by threatening to recognise the GDR, and after the Federal Republic had recognised Israel they did in fact break off diplomatic relations. It became increasingly clear that the Federal Republic could not keep up its policy of isolating the Eastern bloc states and the GDR, because this went against the international trend towards détente and the recognition of post-war realities. The Federal Republic’s policy towards the East and the German question had become paralysed. Since 1961, it had been unable to make progress in any direction. It could neither secure an opening to the East, nor gain any improvement in the situation of the GDR population. It was unable to halt the trend towards international recognition of the GDR, which was clearly apparent not just in the diplomatic field but in culture and above all in sport. It had nothing to set against the momentum of the policy of détente on the basis of the status quo. But the CDU and the CSU neither wished to make a new beginning, nor were they capable of doing so.

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